Tag: nationalism

Yasukuni Nationalism

LECTURE: Mullins on Yasukuni Fundamentalism (Tohoku Univ.)

by Orion Klautau

The Department of Global Japanese Studies at Tohoku University would like to invite you to the following lecture:

Mark R. Mullins (University of Auckland)
“Imperialist Secularization and the Politics of Religious Nationalism”

January 28, 2022 (16:30-18:00 JST)

ABSTRACT:
“Yasukuni Fundamentalism” examines the relationship between religion and resurgent nationalism in contemporary Japan. Although religious fundamentalism is often thought to be confined to monotheistic “religions of the book,” this study identifies the emergence of a fundamentalism rooted in the Shinto tradition and considers its role in shaping postwar Japanese nationalism and politics. Over the past half-century, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Association of Shintō Shrines, and, more recently Nippon Kaigi, have been engaged in collaborative efforts to “recover” or “restore” what was destroyed by the process of imperialist secularization during the Allied Occupation of Japan. This seminar will highlight some of the key findings of this study, including the increased support for the political agenda to revive patriotic education, promote Yasukuni Shrine, and revise the constitution, particularly since the disaster years of 1995 and 2011.


ABOUT THE LECTURER:
Mark R. Mullins is Professor of Japanese Studies and Director of the Japan Studies Centre at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. Prior to this appointment in 2013, he was engaged in academic work in Japan for twenty-seven years and taught at Shikoku Gakuin University, Meiji Gakuin University, and Sophia University. He is the author and co-editor of a number of works, including Religious Minorities in Canada: A Sociological Study of the Japanese Experience (1989), Religion and Society in Modern Japan, co-edited with Shimazono Susumu and Paul Swanson (1993), Christianity Made in Japan (1998), Religion and Social Crisis in Japan, co-edited with Robert Kisala (2001), Disasters and Social Crisis in Contemporary Japan, co-edited with Kōichi Nakano (2016), and Yasukuni Fundamentalism: Japanese Religions and the Politics of Restoration (2021).

Yasukuni and State Shinto

Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo remains a highly disputed space because of its symbolic role. This is seen most clearly in the adjacent museum, which takes a one-sided view of Japan’s role in WW2. The use of the shrine for nationalist ends has been highlighted in a popular manga by Kobayashi Yoshinori.

The popularity of the manga helps shed light on the bitterness of Korean and Chinese feelings towards Japan, for it claims in no uncertain terms that the Japanese Army did not invade Asian countries, but liberated them from colonial rule and goes on to assert that Nanking Massacre was a fabrication, that comfort women were volunteers, and that Japan was victimised by the West as exemplified by the war crime of Hiroshima.

The following paragraphs are extracted from ‘Revisioning a Japanese Spiritual Recovery through Manga’ in The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 47, No. 2, November 25, 2013, by Mark Shields, Associate Professor of Comparative Humanities and Asian Thought at Bucknell University (Lewisburg, PA), and Japan Foundation Visiting Research Fellow at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies (Kyoto, Japan, 2013–14). (Please note that the headings are mine, not those of the original article.)

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What is State Shinto?
The basic “theology” of State Shinto, at least in its later, wartime incarnation, might be summarized as follows: (a) all Japanese belong to a single national body (kokutai), whose “head” is the emperor—not any specific person so much as the “unbroken” Yamato imperial line; (b) the Imperial House, by virtue of its lineal connection to the heavenly kami, as confirmed in the sacred classics, is sacrosanct and inviolable; (c) all Japanese, by virtue of being members of the national body, owe their complete allegiance and filial piety to the emperor, a living kami; (d) by extension, all Japanese must obey the directives of the (imperial) state, even to the point of giving their lives for the kokutai. This is also the theological foundation of Yasukuni Shrine—albeit with a greater emphasis on the glories of self-sacrifice and martyrdom.

Yasukuni background
The shrine that would become Yasukuni was founded in 1869, a year following the Meiji Restoration, as a place for “pacifying” the spirits of all those killed in wars fought for the “nation.” Originally known as Tokyo Shokonsha (literally, Tokyo shrine for the invocation of the dead), the name was changed to Yasukuni Jinja in 1879 at the behest of the Meiji Emperor. As Kobayashi notes, “Yasukuni” was chosen to imply “pacify the nation,” and in a (State) Shinto context this was understood to mean that the primary if not sole purpose of this shrine was to pacify the spirits of the war dead, which would help bring tranquility (and protection) to the national body (kokutai).

Administered directly by the ministries of the Army and Navy, by the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), Yasukuni had entered into popular consciousness as a symbol of Japanese imperial conquest and a focus for the state-sponsored cult of the war dead. Today, Yasukuni enshrines the “souls” of 2.5 million people, including roughly 57,000 women, 21,000 Koreans, 28,000 Taiwanese, at least three Britons and, most controversially by far, 14 individuals indicted as “Class A” war criminals.

All of these men and women “offered their lives to the nation in the upheavals that brought forth the modern state” between 1853 and the present. As such, according to [manga writer] Kobayashi (and Yasukuni itself), those enshrined at Yasukuni are anything but “mere victims”. They are rather “martyrs” (junnansha), “heroic spirits” (eirei), and “(protective) gods of the nation” (gokokushin). As we shall see, the intertwined tropes of martyrdom and victimhood play an important role in the attempt to “restore” Yasukuni—and by extension, the true Japanese spirit and identity.

State Shinto and the Kokugaku roots
In contrast to the coverage of the various political issues raised by Yasukuni, the more specific religious or “theological” elements are often overlooked in popular coverage as well as within scholarly analysis. Yasukuni is, after all, a “shrine,” and one that has played a central role in the formulation and expression of a particular religious ideology that is known today as “State Shinto”.

While there remains much debate over the precise meaning of State Shinto, there is consensus that modern Shinto nationalism has roots in the so-called National Learning or Nativist School (kokugaku) of the mid- to late Edo period (1600–1867). While Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) is the most significant early Figure in Shinto revivalism, it was his self-proclaimed successor, Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843), who transfigured nativist doctrine into a more “heroic” and populist form, focused on loyalty, patriotism and attunement to the spirits of the dead.

Continuing role of Yasukuni as a symbolic space
Although State Shinto was officially “disestablished” after the war, and has, along with ultra-nationalism and militarism, come to be repudiated by the vast majority of the Japanese people, the institutionalized form of Shinto as embodied in the postwar Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Honcho) contains more than a few hints of its more obviously politicized forerunner.  

This is most clear in the promotion (and widely accepted notion) of Shinto as a cultural (if not “ethnic”) form that is somehow inherent to being “Japanese” (a belief that often goes hand-in-hand with a reluctance to label Shinto a “religion”). Indeed, Shinto-consciousness—or, since the word “Shinto” itself is not commonly employed in Japanese, kami,  jinja, or matsuri-consciousness—plays a significant role in contemporary Japanese national identity, though only when reframed in terms that make it appear “cultural” rather than religious or political. 

Explicitly anti-political and anti-religious, this “folkism” or ethno-nationalism (minzokushugi) as a general pattern of thought remains strong in contemporary Japan, and can be readily tapped into by those whose aims are in fact political. 

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Hoffman on Shinto

On the adulteration of Japan’s oldest religion

BY .  JAN 20, 2018. Japan Times

Rudimentary, vague, undefined, undefinable, Shinto for centuries didn’t even have a name. It didn’t need one; there was nothing to distinguish it from, nothing it was not. One good sentence can say everything there is to say about it — this one, for example, by historian Takeshi Matsumae: “In some rural areas even today (1993), elderly villagers face the rising sun each morning, clap their hands together, and hail the appearance of the sun over the peaks of the nearby mountain as ‘the coming of the kami.’”

The scholar Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) | Public domain

That’s Shinto — the way (“to”) of the kami (“shin”). As to the kami — who might they be? “Gods,” we say in English, the language offering nothing better, but it’s too freighted a word, too suggestive of power rather than innocence, of something specific as opposed to anything, one knows not what.

“I do not yet understand the meaning of the word ‘kami’” wrote Motoori Norinaga in 1771. If he didn’t, who did? Norinaga was the foremost scholar of his age; he devoted his life to studying the native literature from its ancient beginnings. “It is hardly necessary to say,” he continued, “that it includes human beings. It also includes such objects as birds, beasts, trees, plants, seas, mountains and so forth. In ancient usage, anything whatsoever that was outside the ordinary, which possessed superior power or which was awe-inspiring, was called kami. … Evil and mysterious things, if they are extraordinary and dreadful, are called kami.”

Shinto teaches nothing, enjoins nothing, demands no submission, works no miracles, effaces evil by cleansing it, transmutes dread into joy. There is no heaven, no hell, no nirvana — just “the rising sun each morning,” “the coming of the kami.”

Troubled times such as ours evoke many longings, not least the one known as primitivism. Why couldn’t things have remained in their pristine state? It’s a mood as old as progress “Take away our baneful progress …” wrote the Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1762, “and all is well.”

A Japanese variant of that mood is traceable back to the sixth century. A civil war fought in 587, says historian Ivan Morris, was “one of the decisive clashes in Japanese history,” though the fighting was on so small a scale that “the battle has not even received an official name.”

At issue was the advent of a strange, foreign religion — Buddhism. Some years earlier a Korean ambassador had come bearing images, books and news of “a wonderful doctrine … of all doctrines the most excellent … hard to explain and hard to comprehend,” but through it “every prayer is fulfilled.”

Norinaga Motoori and his disciples of the Kokugaku school (source unknown)

Emperor Bidatsu (reigned circa 572-585) “leaped for joy” to hear it, says the eighth-century chronicle “Nihon Shoki.” “Never,” said Bidatsu, “from former days until now have we had the opportunity of listening to so wonderful a doctrine.” Wonderful, but unsettling. What would the native gods — the kami — think? What might they do, what havoc unleash, in their anger?

Powerful clans ranged on both sides of the ensuing controversy. The Nakatomi and Mononobe, hereditary ritualists and hereditary warriors respectively, both claiming descent from gods, joined forces in defense of the kami against the upstart Soga, who, on behalf of Buddhism, pleaded, “All the Western frontier lands (China and Korea), without exception, worship it. Shall Yamato (Japan) alone refuse to do so?”

Why not? countered Nakatomi and Mononobe: “Those who have ruled the Empire in this our state have always made it their care to worship … the 180 kami of heaven and earth, the kami of the land and of grain. (If) we were to worship in their stead foreign deities, it may be feared that we should incur the wrath of our national kami.”

Bidatsu leaned toward Soga. A pagoda was built, Buddhist images were worshipped — and pestilence broke out. The kami had spoken. A Buddhist statue was flung into a canal, three foreign child-nuns were publicly whipped in the market-place, and the new faith went underground — only to resurface when, shortly afterward, a recurrence of plague gave it a second chance. Bidatsu’s successor, Yomei, “believed in the law of Buddha and (simultaneously) reverenced Shinto” — seeing nothing mutually irreconcilable in them, worlds apart though they are in spirit. This “Nihon Shoki” passage gives Shinto its name.

Yomei died. A quarrel among would-be successors flared into the war of 587. Soga triumphed. Buddhism was in. Japan’s childhood was over.

Through Buddhism, Japan — primitive, almost prehistoric — entered the dazzling orbit of Chinese civilization. The pivotal figure was Crown Prince Shotoku Taishi (574-622), whose famous “constitution” of 604, fusing Buddhist and Confucian moral precepts, marks Japan’s coming of age.

Harmony, hierarchy and willing obedience from those below to the wise commands of those above became the main themes. On the kami, the document is mute. No wonder, perhaps; the kami had no moral precepts, no morality at all. “All things in heaven and earth are in accordance with the august will of the kami,” said Norinaga 11 centuries later. Good or bad, good or evil, is beside the point: “Among the kami there are good ones and bad ones. Their actions are in accordance with their different natures, so they cannot be understood by ordinary human reason.”

Norinaga’s work contains passages of great beauty. The heart, not the mind, emotion, not reason, lead man to wisdom, he taught. It’s a concept known as mono no aware (the pathos of things). There’s an appealing innocence in his writing. But eschewing “ordinary human reason” is a dangerous business. How he would have felt about the later xenophobic militarists who drew much of their inspiration from him is an open question.

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Michael Hoffman is the author of In the Land of the Kami: A Journey into the Hearts of Japan and Other Worlds.

Adulteration: Paramilitary group worshipping legendary first emperor Jimmu at Kashihara Jingu

Zen and Shinto 12: Martial Connections

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A Kendo contest held at Kashihara Jingu

Brian Victoria, author of Zen at War, recently gave a talk in Kyoto about Zen terrorism in the 1930s. Brian is a Soto Zen priest, and his book has been hugely influential – as well as controversial.   The book focuses on Japanese militarism from the time of the Meiji Restoration through the Second World War and the post-War period. It describes the influence of state policy on Buddhism in general, and particularly the influence on Zen which eagerly supported the military in its war of aggression. A famous quote is from a leading Zen figure, Harada Daiun Sogaku: “[If ordered to] march: tramp, tramp, or shoot: bang, bang. This is the manifestation of the highest Wisdom [of Enlightenment]. The unity of Zen and war of which I speak extends to the farthest reaches of the holy war.”

While reading about Brian Victoria’s book in an article in Japan Focus, I came across the following passage, which suggests a very conscious effort by Zen leaders to assimilate with Shinto in the Edo Period.  It was a time of Kokugaku, when Nativists such as Motoori Norinaga were increasingly influential:

In the Edo period [1600-1867] Zen priests such as Shidō Bunan [1603-1676], Hakuin [1685-1768], and Torei [1721-1792] attempted to promote the unity of Zen and Shinto by emphasizing Shinto’s Zen-like features. While this resulted in the further assimilation of Zen into Japan, it occurred at the same time as the establishment of the power of the emperor system. Ultimately this meant that Zen lost almost all of its independence.

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It seems then that the desire of leading Zen practitioners to align themselves with the Shinto cause brought identification with the nationalism of figures like Motoori (a noted China hater), which was exploited by Meiji leaders in formulating a State Shinto ideology aimed at bolstering the authority of the emperor they controlled.  Acting on behalf of the nation was seen as an act of glorious self-sacrifice, by which the individual ego was sacrificed for the will of the emperor.  It was an ideology to which both Zen and Shinto assented.

It is perhaps not coincidental then that both Zen and Shinto have been closely related to the development of martial arts.  Zen was embraced by the warrior class, who took to its concern with mindfulness, self-discipline, and transcending the fear of death.  Shinto was similarly allied to  martial arts, not surprisingly given that ancient clan kami stood at the forefront of military conflict.  The whole Yamato conquest was fuelled after all by notion of divine legitimacy.  The swords that samurai treasured were imbued with animist spirit and buried with them.

When one thinks about it, there’s a military precision to the rituals of both Shinto and Zen.  Anyone who has stayed overnight at a Zen temple will have noticed the emphasis on obeying orders, marching in line, and correctness in all things.  Similarly those who have seen ceremonies at large Shinto shrines will have noticed the orderliness with which priests walk in file, the attention to detail in their rituals, and the hierarchical nature of the ranking.

It seems then that the military connection provides a key to understanding the commonality of Zen and Shinto.  For those of us in the peace camp, it gives much to be concerned about.  When I spoke to Brian Victoria about this, he suggested that the problem lay in the interaction of State and Religion.  Regardless of the leanings of a particular religion, when it becomes allied to the State through seeking patronage and protection, it necessarily becomes a servant of State in times of war.  Christianity has done it, Islam has done it, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism have done it.  Perhaps there then lies the lesson in all this, and perhaps the hermit tradition of Daoism is the perfect response!

 

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Sword skills displayed at Shimogamo Jinja

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Zabuton cushions laid out in a Zen temple meditation room. Each monk is allotted one tatami and small cupboard space, similar to life in a barracks.

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Obeisance lies at the heart of Shinto – and Zen

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Shaved heads and lined up in a straight row…

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Priests parading in single file are a common sight at Shinto ceremonies.

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